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Abstract
Practitioners as well as academics expect that
blockchain technology is a game changer for a variety
of use cases [1], [2]. This is due to transaction
immutability enabled by keeping a history of all
transactions. Nevertheless, this strength can become its
biggest weakness. There already exists a lively
discussion on scenarios where it is necessary to delete
submitted data from the chain after it is no longer
needed. This becomes even more crucial with the
introduction of the European General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR). In this paper, we make use of a
design science research (DSR) approach to design an
IT artifact in the form of a prototype that maintains
most of the key features of blockchain technology but
deletes old data. We evaluate the prototype with the
help from experts to investigate what to expect from
blockchains that delete data and derive principles on
how to design them.

1. Introduction
When we speak of Blockchain, we generally mean
the technology instead of a specific implementation.
One key property of this technology is its ability to
secure old data against modification. This makes
blockchain an append-only structure, where new data
can be added but never removed. While this is one its
biggest strengths, it can also become its most crucial
weakness.
For example, when information about users needs
to be put on a blockchain, strict privacy laws such as
European General Data Protection Regulation1
(GDPR) and the right of European consumers to
demand that their data is “forgotten” or deleted, pose a
challenge for this technology.
Even when personal information is not directly put
on the blockchain, historical data can be analyzed to
1

Peter Roßbach
Frankfurt School of Finance &
Management
p.rossbach@fs.de

reveal identities of pseudonyms. For example, modern
analysis of Bitcoin transactions has shown that wallets
can be linked together, compromising the owner’s
identity [3].
Consequently, it needs to be recognized that
anonymization techniques may not stand the test of
time. To mitigate such risks, the unnecessary
information needs to be deleted from blockchains as a
preventive measure.
While doing this, it is still useful to store
information such as current account balances and
recent transactions to prevent double spending attacks.
However, there is no evidence storing transactions
ranging multiple years back is a prerequisite for a
secure blockchain.
Existing solutions that allow removing transactions
on a blockchain (like the one provided by Accenture
[4]) involve giving a trusted party permission to
arbitrarily edit the blockchain. Such trusted parties are
only available in specific situations. Since blockchain
is a general technology, a more general, trust-free
solution appears to be needed. We therefore state our
research question:
How can we design a decentralized blockchain that
forgets, and what implications arise from it?
To answer this question, we follow a design science
research (DSR) approach [5]. We develop an IT
artifact in the form of a prototype and evaluate it to
figure out how to design trust-free deleting
blockchains.
This paper starts with a short overview of related
works and theoretical background of blockchain
technology, followed by a brief introduction to the
used DSR approach. We then describe the developed
artifact and evaluate it. Finally, we discuss its
implications, give an outlook and investigate
limitations of our work.
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2. Related Works
Attempts to protect users’ privacy on blockchain
are as old as Bitcoin itself, since the Bitcoin network
employs a few techniques to enable anonymous
transactions. We identified three types of approaches to
solve the problem: anonymization techniques, altering
techniques, and decentralized deletion techniques.
Anonymization techniques store the identifying
information of a user outside the blockchain. Bitcoin
for example, uses anonymous addresses to handle
transactions, and users are free to create and use as
many addresses as they want [6].
Nevertheless, studies have shown that it is possible
to link multiple Bitcoin addresses of the same person
together by analyzing their transaction behavior, with
the success rate increasing as more transactions are
made [7].
To combat this, some anonymization techniques
not only conceal the identity, but also the actions of
each user. As an example, Monero [8] was built to
support untraceable transactions.
It should be noted that the methods mentioned so
far store the anonymized information indefinitely on
the blockchain and are subject to scrutiny for an
indefinite time [9]. As research progresses and
computing power increases, systems currently believed
to be secure may be found vulnerable in the future. As
an example, the earlier versions of the aforementioned
Monero algorithm were cracked, retroactively leaking
identities of old transactions [10].
Blockchain altering techniques give access to a
trusted party to alter or delete transactions. One such
approach was presented by Accenture in 2016 [4].
Using a special mathematical function, it becomes
possible to retroactively replace the content of old
blocks. This solution and other methods we inspected
give access to a trusted party to alter or delete
transactions. In a situation where such trusted parties
can be found, this technique can fix privacy issues by
combining many transactions into one summary
transaction which lacks historical information.
Lastly, we look at decentralized deletion
techniques. Research in this area has focused on the
scaling issues that blockchains face. Pruning data that
is no longer required is advantageous when each new
transaction increases the size of the blockchain. The
amount of research considering its privacy benefits is
sparse. As the algorithms share a main goal, namely to
increase efficiency, they do not always delete
information in a timely manner.
Once again, the Bitcoin paper [6] provides one of
the earliest methods of pruning, with a variation being
implemented in the software in mid-2015 [11].

Unfortunately, Bitcoin’s pruning algorithm keeps
information about the last transaction of each coin.
Another Blockchain technology, Ethereum, seems
more hopeful in this regard.
In an article, the creator of Ethereum, Vitalik
Buterin, has described pruning strategies viable for
Ethereum and suggests a method that removes all old
blocks [12]. As costs of storing transactions are low, no
Ethereum-based software has so far implemented the
suggested algorithm.
The method described in Buterin’s article is
particularly relevant for our research question, as it
leaves no historical information on the disk. Only
account balances and other necessary information is
retained in the long term.
A final point to make is that the pruning algorithms
presented are meant to be run by a few nodes in the
network. Little is known about the side effects of
running networks where every single node prunes
information, therefore globally deleting it.

3. Theoretical Background
A blockchain is, as its name points out, a
concatenation of blocks. Its consistency is ensured by
cryptographic protocols. How this is done in detail is
up to the specific implementation.
While the contents of blocks can be set arbitrarily,
most implementations store transfers of an asset from
participants (inputs) to other participants (outputs) in a
transaction. The transaction is only valid if it is signed
using the private key of the owner of the input.
Therefore, anyone possessing the public key can verify
the transaction, but not modify it. A set of those is then
bundled together in a block. Next to these transactions,
the block includes a checksum of the previous block,
creating a chain structure. Now, if the content of the
previous block is modified, subsequent blocks become
invalid. Every participant holds a complete copy of all
the blocks. By iterating through all transactions, it is
therefore possible to decide if a transaction is allowed
or not.
If new transactions are to be added, they are
grouped together into a new block, for which a
consensus needs to be found. Most approaches do this
using the proof of work algorithm. A checksum for the
new block needs to be calculated. This checksum needs
to fulfill certain predefined requirements (e.g. starting
with 5 zeros). To accomplish this, a nonce is added to
the block. The nodes now compete to find a nonce that
in combination with the transactions and other block
data, yields a checksum that fulfills those requirements.
The winning node (e.g. the first) is granted some
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reward, mostly in the monetary form of tokens. This
process is called ‘mining’.
These blocks are distributed to every participant in
the network and therefore everyone has the same
information.
Smart Contracts and the State
Some state-of-the-art blockchains (e.g. Ethereum or
Hyperledger fabric) provide a powerful additional
feature: the ability to execute code [13]. This extends
the blockchain from simply being a distributed
database to a distributed computer.
Ethereum, for example, can be defined as a Turingcomplete multi-purpose shared computer named the
Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). The machine is a
singleton, so there exists only one global instance.
Using blockchain technology, the state of this machine
(also referred to as the “state”) is agreed upon. The
state acts as a persistent storage medium to store all
account balances, smart contract code (or “EVM code”)
and internal storage.
Each smart contract is given its own internal
storage on the state to store arbitrary information.
Unlike a traditional computer, the EVM limits what
parts of the state may be altered. Participants cannot
spend tokens of an account unless they possess the
associated private key; once deployed, smart contract
code can never be updated, and code only has writeaccess to its own storage space.
The state is modified with transactions, which can
send tokens, upload code or call a smart contract
function. The result of a transaction execution is an
updated state. In addition to this updated state, a
transaction receipt is created. These receipts contain
log messages and errors during the execution. The state
itself does not store any historical information [14].
Ethereum follows a “state-centric model” [15],
meaning that the EVM only requires current state data
to process a transaction. Transaction history is not
available inside the virtual machine.

Figure 1: State transition in Ethereum

Hashes of transactions, receipts, and the state are
included in block headers which make up the
blockchain (see Figure 1). The Ethereum blockchain
uses a proof of work algorithm to generate consensus
on the order of transactions. Ethereum nodes need, just
like their Bitcoin pendants, to download the full
blockchain and verify all transactions. Ethereum nodes
download and verify all transactions that were
executed on the Ethereum computer.
Support for smart contracts in Ethereum has opened
the door to a wide variety of use cases [16]. These
provide new opportunities for companies to work
together and share data. Using blockchain offers data
integrity, security, fail-safety, and can be a costeffective, decentralized alternative to using a service
provider.

4. Research Methodology
In this paper, we make use of a design science
research approach (DSR) [5]. In DSR the goal is
utility, which means that instead of studying an already
existing IT artifact, it involves the identification of an
highly relevant problem [17] — the research cycles for
the creation of a solution and the evaluation of it [18].
This artifact can be of various nature, for example a
construct, model, method, or instantiation [19].
As there existed no solution that fulfilled all our
requirements, we chose a DSR approach.
We followed the DSR methodology by executing
the following steps: (1) identify the relevant problem;
(2) define solution objectives; (3) design and develop
an innovative IT artifact, (4) demonstrate it; and
finally, (5) evaluate it.

4.1 Problem identification
We were made aware of the problem that
immutability of the blockchain technology, and
therefore the restriction that nothing can be deleted,
poses an issue for companies that must follow the
GDPR rules during a conference in 2017. Two
researchers of the group talked to a practitioner from
the financial service industry, who explained that the
fact that companies cannot delete selected or all
information from blocks, rules out using blockchain for
a variety of relevant use cases.
Since the team already experimented with
Ethereum and discussed possibilities to manipulate
data in a blockchain, there already existed an initial
idea to implement that feature. The team therefore
proposed to create a proof-of-concept prototype of an
Ethereum-based blockchain.
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4.2 Definition of objectives
The primary objective is to build a working
prototype to demonstrate that it is possible to delete
transactions from a blockchain while maintaining
functionality. Since this involves tinkering with some
of the fundamental concepts, we define requirements
that the prototype needs to fulfill: (1) it needs to be
tamper-resistant; and (2) all information needs to be
distributed to all nodes in the network. (3) It should be
possible for new nodes to join the network afterwards;
(4) all nodes can add transactions. In addition, the
prototype (5) must be decentralized and may not rely
on trustees and finally (6) we delete every transaction
after a predefined amount of time.

As smart contracts only have access to the state,
their functionality cannot be impaired if we delete old
blocks. Similarly, mining only requires the current
block.
Sending transactions (and simulating their effects
locally to see the consequences) only requires the
current block (and its state) as well. During mining,
multiple solutions can be found for a block’s successor,
creating two or more branches in the blockchain (see
Figure 2). This means that a branch of blocks in the
chain may be exchanged for a longer branch found.
Therefore, clients need access to recent blocks to be
able to stay in sync over extended periods.

4.3 Design and development
To resolve the privacy issues mentioned, we first
develop a new pruning algorithm that locally deletes as
much information as it can without breaking the
software. We then build a private Blockchain network
where every node runs our created pruning algorithm
to conduct tests and our evaluations.
We build the prototype based on the Ethereum
blockchain using the Parity client. Ethereum is one of
the most common and mature protocols that provides
smart contracts. Parity was chosen because the source
code is well-documented, and the members of the team
were already familiar with it.

Designing a pruning algorithm
To develop our pruning algorithm, we first identify
which information stored by clients is not relevant for
the operation of the blockchain. By doing so, we can
assess which information we can safely remove
without impairing the blockchain functionality.
We analyze which features of Ethereum require
access to historical data and validate our conclusions
by looking into the behavior of two Ethereum
implementations: pyethereum [15] and Parity [20].

First sync

Current
block
X

Staying in sync

X

Sending transactions

X

Mining

X

Transaction history

X

Recent
blocks
X

All
blocks
X

X

X

Figure 2: Not every block makes it into the
final chain. Rollbacks are sometimes
necessary.
At this point we can make storing a list of all
blocks optional by making two specific assumptions:
no new nodes are added to the network, and we don’t
need a transaction history. Special solutions for these
cases are discussed in the Limitations section.
With these restrictions in place, we implement a
feature that deletes blocks after a brief period. This
follows GDRP's principle to store data for the shortest
amount necessary.
Through inspection of the Parity code, we identify
databases storing portions of each block, such as
transaction data, receipt data, and state. Each is stored
separately. Multiple indexes are also created to speed
up database lookups.
To delete state data, we make use of an already
implemented feature in Parity called state pruning. It
was implemented to allow increased scalability of a
blockchain, as each new transaction increases the size
of the blockchain.
Unlike state pruning, deleting other data is not
automatically done by the official Parity
implementation. We add a function that deletes all data
stored about a block across nine different databases
(source code available in our GitHub repository2).
The finished software can connect to Ethereum
networks and process new transactions while

X

Table 1. Summary of the dependencies of
each action

2

Available at: https://github.com/Yonom/parity-demo
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automatically deleting old ones locally. We now
proceed to the second development stage.

Building a network that forgets
So far, our software had no effect on a network
because it was the only participant to delete
information. For a network to forget, every participant
must run our pruning algorithm.
We test this scenario using 5 hosts. running our
modified Parity software; and another containing
Etherchain Light [21], an open-source blockchain
explorer.
For testing purposes, we have set the block deletion
duration to 10 blocks (30 seconds). We deployed our
Parity client over five hosts and additionally connected
a block explorer to the first client (see Figure 3).

4.4 Demonstration
We demonstrated the built prototype to experts
from the financial service industry. These experts were
one blockchain engineer and two senior consultants.
Since all our experts had a background in finance, our
use case for the prototype were financial transactions.
For every participant, we conducted a separate session
to introduce the setup, the prototype, and finally, to get
their feedback.
We first introduced the experts to the five hosts that
built the foundation of our blockchain. We then gave a
quick introduction to the user interfaces, the block
explorer and an overview of the basic features (transfer
ether; upload, execute, and delete smart contracts). We
then asked the experts to transfer a few Ether across
accounts. The experts could follow the effect using the
block explorer, especially the format of the transaction
and the resulting changes to the state.
After 30 seconds, the expert witnessed live using
the block explorer how the “pruning” functionality,
(which deletes old blocks,) caused the transactions to
disappear from the block explorer (see Figure 5, for a
screenshot of the situation before and after). The
account, however, kept its balance but lost information
about the token’s origin. Since the experts saw that the
transaction was verified before accepting it and before
it got deleted, they were assured that it is legitimate.

Figure 3: Our network constellation
.
Each host has a Parity user interface (see Figure 4)
that allows interaction with the blockchain on behalf of
that host.

Figure 4: Parity client
Additionally, we provide a block explorer showing
the user a live view of how transactions vanish after a
specific time is passed.

Figure 5: An account with Ether balance and
deleted transactions
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We then proceed to the second part of evaluation,
where we provide the experts with a simple contract
that they can deploy to the blockchain.

Figure 6: Creation of a contract
Figure 6 shows the transaction that creates the
contract. Figure 7 shows how the transaction is deleted
but the contract code remains in the state.

Figure 7: Contract code still exists, but the
creation transaction no longer does
A function in the contract allows the user to set the
text of a variable to their liking (see Figure 8). The
change of this string is sent in the form of a
transaction. Like every other transaction, our experts
observe that it is deleted after 30 seconds, meaning that
only the most updated text is available.

Figure 8: Available smart contract methods

Finally, after some experimentation, the expert calls
the smart contract’s “destroy” function (see Figure 8).
This function internally executes an Ethereum feature
called “self-destruct”, which will remove the contract
code from the state. 30 seconds after this method is
called, no trace of the smart contract ever existing,
including the code itself, remains on the blockchain.
As a last demonstration, we deactivate two random
nodes. One of the nodes is restarted before 30 seconds
elapse and another is restarted after a minute. The node
that was restarted earlier can synchronize to the
network without issue. The other node fails to
synchronize and remains detached from the network.
Nevertheless, the blockchain continues to function
regardless of which nodes are deactivated. It
continuously mines new blocks and deletes old blocks
without issue.

4.5 Evaluation
Based on the feedback we received from the
experts and the issues identified, we assessed the
accomplishment of our original objectives in Section
4.2.
We created a prototype blockchain that can remove
historical data. Our demonstration shows that mining,
transactions, and smart contracts still work despite the
changes made to the software.
Additionally, since we did not alter the transaction
verification protocol, we still possess a tamper-proof
blockchain where only the owners of accounts can
spend their tokens and the code of smart contracts
cannot be altered or deactivated by third parties.
We remain decentralized, and no part of the
network relies on a specific node. All nodes are
configured the same way and we can turn off hosts at
will.
Unfortunately, we hit a few limitations to our
approach, such as the fact that adding new clients to
the network is no longer straightforward.
We also compare our new method to other
available approaches for implementing privacy on the
blockchain based on two criteria: being decentralized
and being immune to retroactive attacks (see Table 2).
We considered a solution decentralized if there were
no central actors with special powers. Therefore, both
anonymization and block deletion techniques are
decentralized. We could not find any decentralized
chain editing techniques.
Immunity to retroactive attacks prevents old
identities being revealed if today’s algorithms are
cracked tomorrow. When sensitive information is kept
indefinitely, as is usually the case with anonymization
techniques, this property is not given. Both chain
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editing and block deletion can permanently remove old
information from blocks therefore, they are immune to
retroactive attacks.
Decentralized
Anonymization

X

Chain editing
Block deletion

Immune to
retroactive attacks
X

X

X

Table 2: Solutions to Blockchain privacy
problems
We conducted evaluation sessions with experts
from the financial service industry. None of the
participants, who were all familiar with blockchain,
expected a working result that could at least partially
solve the problem. At the end of the session, all experts
agreed individually that a GDPR-compliant financial
transaction is possible with the prototype.
However, we received several questions which we
included here.
‘How can the blockchain be secure if we cannot
verify history?’.
The blockchain is secure because we verify every
change to the state. This verification cannot be
repeated after we delete the transactions, but we can
assume that our client verified older transactions.
‘If the blocks are distributed to every participant,
how can I prevent anyone from taking backups?’.
Although we delete the blocks from the chain by
default, the technique does not allow us to prevent
participants from taking backups. Still, this is an
advantage as the standard behavior is to delete and not
to keep data. Another note was that not all data is
meant to be deleted:
‘What if I want to store data longer than a few
seconds?’.
Data in transactions is not available to smart contracts
and transactions only stay around for a few days.
Transactions are therefore not a suitable place to store
information. We recommend storing the data in the
state using smart contract logic.
‘In case someone new joins the chain, who should
they trust, if there are multiple nodes, as there is no
history?’
Since we delete all history, the first block (called the
“genesis” block) does not exist anymore and therefore
cannot be used as an initial syncing point. A node
therefore must ask multiple other nodes for a block in
the middle of the chain and check if they all recognize
this block.

5. Limitations
During our evaluation, we were able to identify
several limitations. First, it seems impractical to run
our network in a public setting. Our approach cannot
enforce a network-wide deletion of old data, since it
cannot control that participants keep backups. Having
some participants make backups defeats the purpose of
our blockchain and thus we believe that for now, it can
only be used inside restricted environments where
additional financial and legal incentives are established
to prevent archiving (e.g. through auditing).
Nevertheless, we recognize a need for future research
in this area.
Second, one loses the built-in history of all actions
performed on smart contracts, as old blocks and their
transactions are removed from history. Smart contract
code is still unalterable in our prototype and one could
log all important information to the state, which is
persistent. The logging is no longer mandatory and
must be explicitly implemented in smart contracts that
require history.
The third shortcoming lies in the process of adding
new nodes. Since the information required to derive the
current state from old transactions is no longer
available on the network, the original “genesis” block
cannot be used as an initial syncing point. Some other
recent block must instead be taken as the starting point.
This process is currently technical and tedious, and we
believe it should be improved through software
updates.
The choice of the correct initial block is subjective
and requires trust. Previous work [22] on “weak
subjectivity” shows that this process is less secure than
using a well-known genesis block, and one must take
great caution and ask multiple sources when looking
for an initial block to trust. Thankfully, the process
must only be executed once during the initial setup of
the node.
Lastly, a node which is turned off for an extended
period will fail to sync to the network as the blocks
lying between its last block and current newest block
may already be deleted. In this case, one must execute
the tedious setup process again. For this reason, we
recommend setting the deletion time to a reasonably
long amount to account for possible system downtimes
(e.g. seven days).

6. Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we gave insights through the design
science research approach that we used to develop and
evaluate a novel IT artifact for the financial services
industry. We accomplished this by first identifying a
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highly relevant problem. After evaluating the existing
approaches and literature, we proposed a possible
solution and defined the objectives that we wanted to
reach with the prototype and the evaluation criteria.
We provided an IT artifact in the form of a working
proof-of-concept prototype of a blockchain that deletes
predefined data after a predefined amount of time. The
prototype was developed in an iterative manner and
was evaluated with the help of domain experts. Finally,
we derived helpful principles for designing dataprotection compliant blockchains.
Our prototype uses a combination of an already
implemented technique (state pruning) and a custom
function to delete logs and other traces, as well as to
enable the logging of predefined transactions in the
state of the EVM.
This approach can be categorized as exaptation, as
it is extending an at least partially known solution to a
new problem, which should yield research opportunity
and knowledge contribution [18]. The evaluation
points out that our prototype solves the posed problem
but introduces a set of limitations.
The limitations we face show us that there is
potential for future research. We see a need for new
smart contract best practices when it comes to
blockchains that forget. Our team plans to investigate
how smart contracts can be monitored and audited
when historical information is not available.
The implications that arose from our results are
twofold. For practitioners, we managed to identify a
way that could allow blockchain technology to be used
in an additional variety of scenarios that couldn’t be
done before. Additionally, while we have focused on
the benefits of block deletion for permissioned
blockchains, the techniques discussed here could be
used to solve scaling issues on public blockchains, as
the amount of data grows too big to be feasible to store
forever.
Finally, there is a lack of understanding on the
possibilities that smart contracts offer. Especially when
it comes to use cases, there is almost no reference
material on the potential abilities of smart contracts
and the possible benefits that an extended use could
bring.
We hope that advancements in the capabilities of
technology, like the one presented in this paper, make
the use of blockchain more practical and speed up
progress in this field.
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